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Abstract 
 
 The United States Supreme Court is one of the most influential government institutions in 
America.  As gatekeepers of our nation’s integrity, they are expected to bypass their own beliefs 
on certain issues and make decisions based purely on precedence and the laws of the 
Constitution of the United States. But how much of a Supreme Court justice’s decision is 
influenced by his or her personal ideology?  This paper seeks to determine if a significant 
correlation exists between a given justice’s ideology and their voting patterns by analyzing death 
penalty decisions specifically.  Analysis was conducted by finding an external rating for each 
justice’s ideology, called Martin-Quinn scores, and comparing them with a “conservativeness 
scale” that was derived from 25 death penalty decisions.  The results show that a strong 
correlation exists between a Supreme Court justice’s ideology and the way they vote in death 
penalty cases.  The findings of this project bring to light other serious questions: Based on the 
pattern of voting, can we say that the Supreme Court – theoretically the most objective American 
institution – can ever be truly unbiased? Is this expectation of objectivity realistic? Are the biases 
that are manifested in the Supreme Court’s decisions a violation of American democracy? 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
  
 The United States Supreme Court is the most powerful entity in our government. The 
Supreme Court has the right and the power to review the constitutionality of laws that are passed 
by Congress, decisions that are made by lower courts, and even actions made by the president. 
These powers cannot be superseded by any other entity and there is no real check on Supreme 
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Court decisions. It is for this reason that the United States Supreme Court is both one of the most 
interesting and most controversial government institutions in America.   
 This paper aims is to identify the ideological tendencies of Supreme Court justices in 
their decision making and how those tendencies obstruct justices from making fair and accurate 
interpretations of the United States Constitution.   The goal of this thesis paper is to analyze the 
decisions made by Supreme Court justices and to attempt to find a pattern in the way they vote 
on certain issues.  I will track the votes cast in Supreme Court death penalty decisions and match 
those votes along the ideological lines of each justice.  If there is a pattern in the way that 
justices vote, can we say that our Supreme Court – which is supposed to be the most objective 
institution in our American government – can ever be truly unbiased?  If the Supreme Court 
cannot stand as the ultimate fair and impartial interpreter of our nation’s Constitution, are the 
biases manifested in these decisions a violation of American democracy? 
  
 
 
Background 
 
 The position of a Supreme Court justice is a prestigious one that begins with the current 
President’s nomination.  The President may receive suggestions or recommendations from his 
advisors or he may already have a certain individual in mind.  Many times, Supreme Court 
justices are nominated on the basis of their own political and personal connections with the 
President or based on their experience in a lower U.S. court.   
 After the President has made his nomination, the Senate then must approve the 
nomination by a majority vote (51 votes).  This involves review of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, which considers the individual’s background information gathered by the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation and judicial record.  The Committee also conducts an interview with the 
nominee to learn more about their political philosophy and ideology.  If the Committee decides 
to make a recommendation for the nominee, they send the vote to the Senate floor. 
 A remarkable aspect of the Supreme Court justice’s position is that once they are 
nominated and receive a majority of votes in the Senate, they cannot be unseated.  A justice is 
expected to hold a seat on the Court for the rest of his natural life or until he or she wishes to 
retire from the position.  The goal of this process is to ensure that political or social pressure 
surrounding Court decisions does not affect the decision making of Supreme Court justices.  
Ultimately, the non-election appointment process and the protection from removal of office are 
meant to guarantee that each justice interprets the Constitution fairly.  
 With a total of nine sitting justices, the decisions made are directly affected by the 
ideological majority that is sitting at that time.  For the purpose of this paper, I will be analyzing 
the Supreme Court justices from the late 1960s through the early 1990s.  During these years, 
there are three separate instances that the Court rendered decisions and then shortly after 
overturned them.  By looking at the sitting justices during these years and the balance of 
ideologies that existed, it becomes evident that the overturning of the three specific cases was the 
cause of a change in the balance of the Court’s ideological make-up.  
In 1968, a liberal Court decided 6-3 in Witherspoon v. Illinois, (391 U.S. 510) that a 
prospective juror cannot be removed from the panel “for cause” simply for voicing objections to 
the death penalty (391 U.S. 510).  Years later in 1986, the conservative Burger Court overturned 
its prior decision in Witherspoon.  In Lockhart v. McCree (476 U.S. 162), the Court decided that 
a prospective juror may be excused “for cause” if his opposition to the death penalty would 
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impair his performance to decide death in the sentencing phase of a capital trial (476 U.S. 162).  
Figure 1 shows the difference in the ideological make-up of the Supreme Court in the years that 
Witherspoon and Lockhart were decided.  With the exception of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
White, an entirely new court decided Lockhart.  Of the six new justices, Justices Rehnquist and 
Burger were conservatives. The remaining four – Justices Stevens, Blackmun, O’Connor and 
Powell – were traditionally moderate but voted with the conservatives in the case.  The swing of 
the Court to a conservative majority caused Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) to be overturned.  
 
 
Figure 1. Ideological Differences 1968 vs. 1986 
 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 
     Majority                          Dissent        Majority                           Dissent 
Warren (L)                            Black (C) Burger (C)                           Brennan (L) 
Douglas (L)                          Harlan (C) White (M)                           Marshall (L) 
Brennan (L)                          White (C) Blackmun (M)                    Stevens (M) 
Stewart (M) Powell (M) 
Fortas (L) Rehnquist (C) 
Marshall (L) O’Connor (M) 
 
 
In 1982, the Supreme Court was ideologically balanced with two consistent liberals and 
two consistent conservatives.  Four justices were considered as moderate, two of which usually 
voted liberal and two who usually voted conservative.  Justice White, a moderate, served as a 
swing vote on this Court for years.  In a 5-4 decision in Edmund v. Florida (1982), Justice White 
sided with the liberals. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to put someone to death for a 
murder that they did not “actually” or “intentionally” commit (458 U.S. 782).  Only five years 
later in another 5-4 decision, the Court overturned its decision in Edmund with the help of Justice 
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White’s swing to a conservative vote (see Figure 2).  It held in Tison v. Arizona (1987) that a 
major participant in a felony murder who did not actually commit the murder may be sentenced 
to death if he showed a “reckless indifference for human life” (481 U.S. 137).  In this situation, a 
swing to conservative vote of an ideological moderate reversed one of its prior landmark death 
penalty decisions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Ideological Differences 1982 vs. 1987 
 
Edmund v. Florida (1982) Tison v. Arizona (1987) 
     Majority                          Dissent       Majority                            Dissent 
White (M)                       O’Connor (M) O’Connor (M)                     Brennan (L) 
Brennan (L)                    Rehnquist (C)  Rehnquist (C)                      Blackmun (M) 
Blackmun (M)                Burger (C) Scalia (C)                            Stevens (M) 
Stevens (M)                    Powell (M) Powell (M)                          Marshall (L) 
Marshall (L) White (M) 
 
 
A change in the ideological balance of the Supreme Court overturned a decision again in 
1991 (see Figure 3).  Four years earlier in 1987, the Court decided in Booth v. Maryland that the 
Constitution prohibits a jury from considering victim impact statements during the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial (482 U.S. 496).  At the time of this decision, there was a balance between 
liberals and conservatives with three moderate justices.  In Booth, moderate Justices Powell and 
Stevens voted with the liberals.  However, by 1991 the dynamic of the Court had changed.  
Justices Powell and Brennan left and were replaced by Justices Kennedy and Souter, who were 
both conservative.  When Payne v. Tennessee came before the Supreme Court, it was able to 
reconsider the issue of victim impact statements in death penalty cases.  The newly conservative 
Court overturned the decision in Booth. It decided that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a 
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jury from considering victim impact statements because this type of evidence shows the victim’s 
“uniqueness as a human being” (501 U.S. 808).   
 
 
Figure 3. Ideological Differences 1987 vs. 1991 
 
Booth v. Maryland (1987) Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 
     Majority                            Dissent       Majority                              Dissent 
Powell (M)                      White (M) Rehnquist (C)                      Marshall (L) 
Brennan (L)                     Rehnquist (C) White (M)                            Blackmun (M) 
Marshall (L)                    O’Connor (M) O’Connor (M)                      Stevens (M) 
Blackmun (M)                 Scalia (C) Scalia (C) 
Stevens (M) Kennedy (C) 
 Souter (C) 
 
 
These instances in which a change in the ideological make-up of the Supreme Court 
completely reverses prior Court decisions are significant.   It shows first and foremost that aside 
from the traditionally moderate justices, the votes of consistently liberal and consistently 
conservative justices are relatively predictable.  Moreover, this type of pattern suggests that 
rather than interpreting the Constitution the way the founding fathers meant it to be interpreted, 
liberal and conservative justices are using their own personal values and beliefs to decide federal 
cases that come before them.  Ideally, each and every justice appointed to the Supreme Court 
would act as a “swing vote” – the decision they make in a particular case would depend wholly 
on the facts of that case and in what ways the Constitution applies.  Instead, the instances 
discussed above suggest that in reality, the Constitution is what those nine people sitting on the 
Court at the time say it is.  
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II. Prior Research on the Topic 
 
 
 The issue of Supreme Court justices making decisions on an ideological basis rather than 
impartially is not a new concept.  In 1989, Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover performed 
studies that attempted to analyze the relationship between Supreme Court justices’ ideological 
values and how they voted.  The study, entitled Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme 
Court Justices, sought to test the “common assumption that Supreme Court justices’ votes 
directly reflect their attitudes, values, and personal policy preferences” (Segal & Cover, 557).   
 In order to perform the study, Segal and Cover used content analysis techniques to derive 
independent and reliable measures of the values of Supreme Court justices. In what they called 
the “attitudinal model,” the authors strived to determine the effect the justices’ attitudes on their 
decision making.  To do this, they first had to find a way to measure the values of the justices.  
After weeding out possible ways of measuring such values, the authors used newspaper articles 
containing ideological content on all Supreme Court justices from Earl Warren to Anthony 
Kennedy.   
Segal and Cover used two newspapers with liberal stances (the New York Times and 
Washington Post) and two with conservative stances (the Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles 
Times).  To conduct the content analysis, each paragraph of articles about Supreme Court 
justices’ nominations was coded for political ideology by counting the number of liberal, 
conservative, or moderate statements made by the justice.  The authors then plugged the numbers 
derived from the content analysis into a mathematical formula to create reliable measurements of 
each justice’s ideological values.   
10 
 
The scores of the content analysis were believed to be accurate measures of the 
perceptions of the justices’ values at the time of their nominations.  Justices Marshall and 
Brennan were the most liberal and Justices Scalia and Rehnquist were the most conservative.  
The dependant variable in the study were the votes of all justices appointed since the beginning 
of the Warren Court in all cases involving civil liberties (since all coded newspaper articles 
included the discussion of civil liberties).  
 Segal and Cover found the results of the study to be straightforward.  They concluded 
that “the correlation between the ideological values of the justices and the way they voted in civil 
liberties cases” was significant (Segal & Cover, 561).  Overall, the results provided exceptional 
support for the attitudinal model as applied to civil liberties cases.   
More recently in 2009, Tom S. Clark published an article in Political Research Quarterly 
that addressed the polarization of Supreme Court justices’ ideologies and its effect on policy 
output.  The article, entitled Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme 
Court, uses prior content analysis information like the study performed by Segal and Cover to 
make new theorizations about the relationship between ideological polarization and Supreme 
Court justices’ decision making.   
In addition to these earlier studies, Clark also developed a polarization measure to help in 
his analysis.  He predicted that “the greater the degree of ideological divergence among a set of 
justices, the less likely those justices will be to join a common opinion” (Clark, 153).  Clark’s 
results supported these predictions; the study suggested “that the polarization statistic is in fact a 
strong predictor of divisive decision making on the Supreme Court” (Clark, 152).  Clark also 
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concluded that a positive relationship existed between the level of ideological polarization on a 
Court and the number of cases decided by a one-vote margin (5-4 decision). 
 
III. Methodology 
 
 This thesis project attempts to identify a significant relationship between a Supreme 
Court justice’s ideology and the way that justice votes in death penalty cases.  In order to 
perform an experiment, I first needed to find a way to give a numerical value to the justices’ 
ideologies.  Since earlier experiments with similar thesis (like Segal and Cover) used the 
expressed written opinions of Supreme Court justices in newspaper articles to formulate 
ideological measures, I considered this tactic.  However, I found that such a task would be nearly 
impossible simply because the death penalty as a political issue is not a widely discussed one. 
Compared to Segal and Cover’s undertaking to analyze civil liberty articles, the odds of finding a 
large enough sample size of articles regarding each Supreme Court justice’s ideological stance 
on the death penalty are slim.  For this reason, analyzing the death penalty opinions of Supreme 
Court justices to create an ideological measure would not have worked for this project. 
 I next considered using the ideology or political party affiliation of individual nominating 
presidents to measure ideological values.  This option quickly proved to be a poor one.  United 
States presidents have the power to make nominations for Supreme Court appointments. They 
are known to make these nominations based on the ideology and decision-making history of a 
candidate. However, many times that justice (once approved by Congress) sets forth decisions 
that are completely contrary to the ideological and political trends of the president that 
nominated them.  Justice Byron White, nominated by Democratic president John F. Kennedy, 
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was notorious for making difficult decisions and often voted with the right wing on many 
controversial issues.  Likewise, Sandra Day O’Connor was nominated by Republican president 
Ronald Regan, but often had the swing vote in the later years of her seat on the Court.  Since the 
ideology and political party affiliation of presidents proved to be an inaccurate indicator of how a 
Supreme Court justice would make decisions once appointed, this measure would not provide an 
accurate numerical value of a justice’s ideology.   
 Empirical articles and presidential ideologies falling short, I decided to look at the way 
each justice voted in lower court decisions to measure their individual ideological values.  I first 
considered researching how each justice (beginning with William Brennan and ending with John 
Roberts) voted on particular issues.  For example, the research would include the way each 
justice voted on cases involving civil liberties in a specific time frame.  The analysis would 
include adding up the number of times each justice voted either conservatively or liberally and 
then creating a numerical value of individual ideology out of those summations.  This tactic 
posed a few problems and disadvantages.  Primarily, researching and recording every justice’s 
voting history in a particular topic area would be incredibly time-consuming.  Secondly, pulling 
decisions from only one area of law would create an inaccurate sample size since I would be 
using only civil liberty cases to define each justice’s ideological stance.  The thesis would then 
be measuring the strength of the voting relationship between civil liberty cases and death penalty 
cases, rather than measuring the strength of the relationship between a justice’s ideology and the 
way he or she votes in capital cases.  
 I ultimately decided that analyzing the voting patterns of each justice in lower court 
decisions would provide the most accurate numerical value for ideology, but that using an 
external measurement would eliminate the problems I would otherwise face by performing my 
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own research.  An external rating of the ideological measures of Supreme Court justices would 
certainly have more validity than conducting my own research on lower court decisions.   
 The external measurements that I chose to use for this project are called Martin-Quinn 
scores.  These scores were developed by political scientists Andrew Martin (Washington 
University School of Law) and Kevin Quinn (UC Berkley School of Law) in 2008 and are 
updated on a yearly basis.  Martin and Quinn sought to measure the relative location of United 
States Supreme Court justices on an ideological continuum in order to better understand the 
politics of the high court and to create a building block for other statistical models of the 
Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn).   
 The two datasets created contain scores for the October 1937 through October 2010 term 
of the United States Supreme Court.  For the purpose of this thesis paper, I utilized only the 
information from 1956 (the beginning of William Brennan’s term) until 2010 since my analysis 
of Supreme Court death penalty decisions starts with the Court’s 1968 decision in Witherspoon 
v. Illinois.  The data collected does not include analysis on the decisions made by Sonia 
Sotomayor (appointed to the Court in 2009) or Elena Kagan (appointed to the Court in 2010) 
because there is not enough data available to create an accurate ideological value.  The “Court” 
dataset contains court-specific quantities and were therefore irrelevant for deciphering the 
numerical value of ideology.  Instead, I was able to utilize the “Justices” dataset, which 
contained the ideal point estimates for each justice in each term.  On the ideological scale 
devised by Martin and Quinn, the overall minimum score of -6.36 represented the most liberal 
score on the spectrum, while the overall maximum score of 4.38 represented the most 
conservative score.  Based on this spectrum, a justice’s “ideal point” essentially refers to their 
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ideological score based on past decisions.  Martin and Quinn recommend using the posterior 
mean (post_mn) in the Justices dataset as the estimate ideal point of each justice in each term.  
Since Martin and Quinn provided the ideal points for each year of a justice’s term, I simply 
averaged the ideal points together to create one single ideal point that would serve as the 
independent variable (ideological value for each justice).  Since Martin and Quinn update the 
scores yearly, their work provides me with a current and valid external ideology rating.   
 Once I was able to create a single value for the independent variable, I then had to 
generate a way of giving a numeric value to the dependent variable – the way each justice voted 
in Supreme Court death penalty cases between the years of 1968 and 2009.  A total of 25 
landmark cases were reviewed and analyzed: Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), McGautha v. 
California (1971), Furman v. Georgia (1972), Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Coker v. Georgia 
(1977), Lockett v. Ohio (1978), Beck v. Alabama (1980), Edmund v. Florida (1982), Florida v. 
Wainwright (1986), Tison v. Arizona (1987), McKlesky v. Kemp (1987), Stanford v. Kentucky 
(1989), Penry v. Lenaugh (1989), Herrera v. Collins (1993), Schlup v. Delo (1995), Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), Tennard v. Dretke (2004), Roper v. Simmons (2005), Oregon v. Guzek (2006), 
Kansas v. Marsh (2006), House v. Bell (2006), Medellin v. Texas (2008), Baze v. Rees (2008), 
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), and Harbison v. Bell (2009).   
Data collection included going through each decision individually and tallying the 
number of liberal votes and conservative votes each justice cast.  Once each of the cases was 
analyzed, I then was able to give a proportion of the number of conservative votes for each of the 
17 justices.  I translated this proportion to a percentage of conservative votes cast.  Finally, I 
created my own “Conservativeness scale” by making that percentage a single number on a 1-10 
scale.  For example, Justice Byron White voted conservatively in 10 out of 14 of his decisions in 
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the death penalty cases chosen for analysis.  This proportion was converted to a percentage of 
71%, which on a 1-10 scale would translate into a conservativeness value of 7.1.  On the scale 
created, a score of 0 represents a justice who voted very liberally in the death penalty cases, a 
score of 5 represents a justice who voted equally with the left and right wing blocks, and a score 
of 10 represents a justice who voted very conservatively.  Figure 4 displays the conservativeness 
scale created by the analysis of 25 death penalty cases compared with the Martin-Quinn scores. 
 
Figure 4. Supreme Court Justice Death Penalty Decisions (Brennan-Roberts) compared with MQ 
Scores 
Justice Conservative 
Decisions 
Liberal 
Decisions 
Majority 
Ideology 
Proportion 
Conservative 
Cons. Scale MQScore 
Brennan 0 11 Liberal 0 of 11 - 0% 0 -1.76 
White 10 4 Conservative 10 of 14 - 71% 7.1 0.44 
Marshall 0 13 Liberal 0 of 13 - 0% 0 -2.84 
Burger 6 2 Conservative 6 of 8 - 75% 7.5 1.85 
Blackmun 2 11 Liberal 2 of 13 - 15% 1.5 -1.86 
Powell 6 3 Conservative 6 of 9 - 67% 6.7 0.94 
Rehnquist 16 0 Conservative 16 of 16 - 100% 10 2.84 
Stevens 3 19 Liberal 3 of 21 - 14% 1.4 -1.51 
O'Connor 8 3 Conservative 8 of 11 - 73% 7.3 0.9 
Scalia 16 0 Conservative 16 of 16 - 100% 10 2.76 
Kennedy 7 7 Moderate 7 of 14 – 50% 5 0.89 
Souter 0 12 Liberal 0 of 12 - 0% 0 -0.81 
16 
 
 
 
 The Martin-Quinn scores and the conservativeness scale provided me with single numbers for 
both my dependent and independent variable for each justice.  Once I created these, I was able to 
code the variables and run a correlation on them in SPSS to decide if a significant relationship 
existed between them.  The conservativeness scale, which represents the way each justice voted 
in death penalty cases (dependent variable x), was coded by giving .00 as the value for very 
liberal, 5.00 as the value for moderate, and 10.00 as the value for very conservative.  Ideology 
(independent variable y) was coded by giving each individual ideal point value (or Martin-Quinn 
score) the label to which it corresponds.  For example, Justice Marshall’s MQ score was -2.84, so 
the ideology variable was given the value of -2.84 and labeled “Marshall.” 
 
 
IV. Results 
After running the correlation between Supreme Court justices’ ideology and the way they 
voted in death penalty cases, I found that there was a significant relationship between the two 
variables.  Figure 5 shows the correlation between the independent and dependent variables. 
 
Alito 5 0 Conservative 5 of 5 - 100% 10 1.77 
Thomas 11 1 Conservative 11 of 12 - 92% 9.2 4.02 
Ginsburg 1 10 Liberal 1 of 11 - 9% 0.09 -1.51 
Breyer 1 10 Liberal 1 of 11 - 9% 0.09 -0.93 
Roberts 5 2 Conservative 5 of 7 - 71% 7.1 2.00 
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Figure 5. Correlation Table 
Correlations 
 
justice ideology 
way they voted 
in death penalty 
cases 
Pearson Correlation 1 .926** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
justice ideology 
N 17 16 
Pearson Correlation .926** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
way they voted in death 
penalty cases 
N 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 The first numbers at the top of the table are Pearson Correlation numbers. The Pearson 
Correlation numbers measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the 
two variables.  The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1, with -1 representing a perfect 
negative correlation between the variables, a 0 representing no correlation at all between the 
variables, and +1 representing a perfect positive relationship between the variables.  When a 
variable is correlated with itself, it will always have a correlation of 1, as shown in the top left 
and bottom right boxes of the SPSS correlation table in Figure 5. The correlation shows that 
justice ideology and the way they voted in death penalty cases have a Pearson Correlation of 
.926, which means that the variables have a strong correlation. 
 The next number on the table represents the p-value associated with the correlation that 
was run.  If the p-value is greater than .05, the correlation is not significant and you must accept 
the null hypothesis.  Since my hypothesis states that a direct correlation exists between ideology 
and voting in death penalty cases, the null would state that there is no significant correlation 
18 
 
between these variables.  However, the correlation shows that the p-value is .000, which is less 
than .05.  This means that the correlation is significant and that I can reject the null hypothesis.   
 I also ran the variables through a simple scatter plot on SPSS to visually display the direct 
relationship.  From the scatter plot of the variables ideology and death penalty voting below, 
Figure 6 shows that the points tend along a line that begins at the bottom left of the graph and 
ends at the top right of the graph.  This is another way of showing that the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables is positive.    
Figure 6. Justice Ideology vs. Voting in Death Penalty Cases 
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V. Conclusion 
 Much research has been performed to identify the ideological tendencies of Supreme 
Court justices and the way those tendencies translate into decision making patterns.  I have yet to 
find, though, any kind of research attempting to make a specific connection between justices’ 
ideologies and their voting patterns in death penalty cases.  It was this gap in research, matched 
with my interest in the death penalty in America, which motivated me to find out more about the 
relationship between the two. The goal of this research and analysis was a straightforward one: 
to discover whether or not a significant relationship exists between a Supreme Court justice’s 
ideology and the way they vote in death penalty cases.  Suspecting that, like most other areas of 
the law, a positive relationship did exist, I also wanted measure the strength of that relationship.   
 My findings that (1) there is a significant relationship between a justice’s ideology and 
their voting patterns in death penalty cases on the Supreme Court and (2) that the relationship is 
a strong one were expected.  However, the fact that this relationship exists suggests that Supreme 
Court justices are using the wrong criteria to make their decisions.  The position of Supreme 
Court justice theoretically embodies complete and total partiality and devotion to interpreting the 
intentions of the founding fathers through the wording of the Constitution of the United States.  
It is doubtful that “We the People” view this type of decision-making by the government’s 
highest court as fair.  Perhaps the most useful consequence from studies and research such as the 
findings uncovered in this paper is that there is a problem with the Supreme Court system – it is 
not the unbiased entity that we say it is.  Americans see the Supreme Court as nine of America’s 
finest men and women, with the fanciest education and the highest principles, who work to 
uphold the integrity of the Constitution.  In reality, a Supreme Court justice is only one person 
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whose right or left wing beliefs win him the president’s support and who can impress enough 
members of Congress to be voted into a seat.  The Supreme Court, like anything else, is political.  
Despite what we might want to believe as enthusiasts of our government, the justices that sit on 
that Court are subject to the same political influences and personal motivations as anyone else.  
This research is just another example of that fact. 
 This research and its findings are also important in the context of the death penalty 
specifically.  The table displayed in Figure 4 shows that Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
voted liberally in 100% of the death penalty cases for which they heard.  In their dissents, the 
basis of most of Brennan and Marshall’s decisions is that they do not believe in the death penalty 
per se.  This means that both believe the death penalty is wrong, so they are unlikely to ever 
enforce it.  In any other state or federal capital case, an attorney has the power to oust any 
potential juror who voices such an opinion on the death penalty for fear that it is unfair to the 
defendant.  Why, then, is a Supreme Court justice entitled to sit on our nation’s highest court 
with such an opinion?  A reasonable person would believe that if a practice is unfair to a 
defendant in a lower court, it most certainly would be unfair in a higher court as well.  This is an 
issue that should warrant concern and that needs to be addressed in the near future. 
 Given the simplicity of the goals of this thesis, there are limitations to its interpretations.  
This thesis does not attempt to extend to a causal relationship between a justice’s ideology and 
their voting patterns in death penalty cases.  It merely aimed to establish a meaningful 
correlation between the variables.  Therefore, there a need for future research that includes 
identification of a range of control variables so that causality can be tested.  Until then, 
Americans are forced to answer the question: In our political world, can we reasonably expect 
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the members of the Supreme Court to act as unbiased interpreters?  The findings of this study 
and many before it suggest that the answer is sad, but true.  
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